MEN AND MARKETS: ECONOMICS AS ENGINEERING SCIENCE

Authors

  • Axel Ockenfels Cologne University
  • Achim Wambach Cologne University

Abstract

The 2012 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economics (Nobel Prize in Economics) was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley «for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design». With their works the two economists have laid the foundation for a new research field: market design. 

References

Alexander Rasch/Achim Wambach, On Auctions and Competitive Policy, in: Manfred Neumann/Jürgen Weigand (eds), International Handbook of Compe¬tition, volume 2, Cheltenham, England, to appear.

Alvin E. Roth, New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization, Science 250, 1990, 1524-1528;

Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (3), 2007, 37-58.

Alvin E. Roth, The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives, Mathematics of Operations Research 7 (4), 1982, 617-628.

Alvin E. Roth / Axel Ockenfels, Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet, American Economic Review 92 (4), 2002, 1093-1103.

Alvin E. Roth/Elliott Peranson, l. c.

Alvin E. Roth / Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design, American Economic Review 89, 1999, 748 - 780;

Alvin E. Roth / Tayfun Sönmez/M. Utku Ünver, Kidney Exchange, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2), 2004, 457-488.

Atila Abdulkadiroglu / Parag A. Pathak/Alvin E. Roth, Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match, American Economic Review 99 (5), 2009, 1954-1978.

Atila Abdulkadiroglu / Yeon-Koo Che/Yosuke Yasuda, Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The Boston Mechanism Reconsidered, American Economic Review 101 (1), 2011, 399-410.

Attila Abdulkadiroglu / Parag A. Pathak/Alvin E. Roth/Tayfun Sönmez, The Boston Public School Match, American Economic Review, Papers and Pro¬ceedings, 95 (2), 2005, 368-371.

Axel Ockenfels, Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (Market Design and Experimantal Economics), Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 10 (2009), 31-54.

Axel Ockenfels / Alvin E. Roth, Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior, in: Zvika Neeman/Al Roth/Nit Vulkan (eds), The Handbook of Market Design, Oxford University Press, to appear.

Axel Ockenfels / Alvin E. Roth, Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction, Games and Economic Behavior 55 (2), 2006, 297-320;

David Gale / Lloyd S. Shapley: College Administrations and the Stability of Marriage, The American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1), 1962, 9-15

Fuhito Kojima / Parag A. Pathak, Incentives and Stability in Large Two-sided Matching Markets, American Economic Review 99, 2009, 608-627.

Gary E. Bolton / Axel Ockenfels, Behavioural Economic Engineering, Journal of Economic Psychology 33(3), 2012, 665-676.

Gary E. Bolton / Ben Greiner / Axel Ockenfels, Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information, Management Science, to ap¬pear.

Gary E. Bolton / Elena Katok/Axel Ockenfels, How Effective Are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation, Management Science 50 (11), 2004, 1587-1602;

Georg Gebhardt / Achim Wambach, Auctions to Implement the Efficient Market Structure, International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, 2008, 846¬859.

John F. Nash / Rosemarie Nagel / Axel Ockenfels/Reinhard Selten, The Method of Agencies Coalition Formation in Experimental Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, to appear.

John H. Kagel / Alvin E. Roth, The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 2000, 201-235.

Katharina Huesmann / Achim Wambach, Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns, working paper, 2012.

Nicola Dimitri / Gustavo Piga / Giancarlo Spagnolo (eds), Handbook of Procurement, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Paul Klemperer, Bidding Markets, Occasional Paper No. 1, UK Competition Commission 2005.

Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auction Design, working paper 2012.

Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, in: Martin Cave/Sumit Majumdar/Ingo Vogelsang (eds), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Amsterdam 2002, columns 605-639.

Stephan Knapek / Achim Wambach, Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction, CESifo working paper 3983, 2012.

www.matching-in-practice.eu/

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Published

22.09.2017

How to Cite

Ockenfels, Axel, and Achim Wambach. “MEN AND MARKETS: ECONOMICS AS ENGINEERING SCIENCE”. Journal of European Economy, vol. 12, no. 1, Sept. 2017, pp. 107-16, https://jeej.wunu.edu.ua/index.php/enjee/article/view/639.

Issue

Vol. 12 No. 1 (2013): JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY

Section

NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS

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