CENTRAL BANK BEHAVIOR IN MODERN MONETARY THEORY
Keywords:
Central banks, discrete decision, monetary policy, monetary rule, time inconsistency, transparency.Abstract
The gnosiological base of modern monetary theories is revealed on the basis of the maintenance analysis and rational expectations. The author confirms that pracsiologacal conclusions of time inconsistency model have not found wide approval at monetary policy theoretical and fundamental levels. It is proved that the further development of monetary theories depends on optimum institutional mechanisms of trust to the central banks and flexibility of their reactions to macroeconomic shocks maintenance. On its basis the adaptibility of models which are methodologicalally connected with a new macroeconomic paradigm to monetary policy institutional and functional requirements is substantiated.
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